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ABSTRACT
Common anti-phishing advice tells users to mouse over links,
look at the URL, and compare to the expected destination,
implicitly assuming that they are able to read the URL. To
test this assumption, we conducted a survey with 1929 partici-
pants recruited from the Amazon Mechanical Turk and Prolific
Academic platforms. Participants were shown 23 URLs with
various URL structures. For each URL, participants were
asked via a multiple choice question where the URL would
lead and how safe they feel clicking on it would be. Using la-
tent class analysis, participants were stratified by self-reported
technology use. Participants were strongly biased towards
answering that the URL would lead to the website of the or-
ganization whose name appeared in the URL, regardless of
its position in the URL structure. The group with the highest
technology use was only minorly better at URL reading.
Author Keywords
Uniform Resource Locators; web literacy; URL readability;
link destination; online security; technology usage; phishing
CCS Concepts
•Security and privacy→Usability in security and privacy;
•Human-centered computing→ Usability testing; Hyper-
text / hypermedia; Empirical studies in HCI; •Social and
professional topics→ Computing literacy;
INTRODUCTION
Malicious web links embedded in emails and other commu-
nications continue to plague companies resulting in compro-
mises and lost revenue. FBI’s Internet Crime Report estimates
that phishing loses exceeded $29 million in 2017 for US or-
ganizations [40]. The Ponemon Institute estimates phishing
costs UK organizations an average of $2.01 million per inci-
dent [35].
Automatic phishing detection, which is used by most organi-
zations, is the most straight forward solution allowing orga-
nizations to detect and remove obviously malicious commu-
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nication before it reaches users. Browsers also automatically
block and provide warnings when they are confident that a
URL is phishing [13]. Unfortunately, automatic detection is
not perfect, sometimes allowing through malicious links or
blocking benign ones [41]. Automatic detection systems also
have difficulty identifying targeted communications which are
carefully crafted and sent to a single target, known as spear
phishing. In 2017, Google and Facebook were both tricked
into paying $100 million to a scammer who was impersonating
a manufacturer with whom the two companies interact [18].
To handle the fact that some malicious communications get
through filters, security experts turn to users as the last line of
defense, providing them with training and expecting them to
identify phishing attacks, which they are not necessarily good
at [14, 15]. Properly training people to detect phishing is also
possibly more expensive than it is worth [21]. Knowing what
advice to even train users with is also tricky. When security
experts were asked to provide advice to internet users, “Don’t
click on dangerous links” and “Check the URL for an expected
site” were common pieces of advice [37]. Both pieces of
advice are based on the assumption that if the user pays close
attention to the link text, they will be able to determine that
it goes to a different website than what the accompanying
message claims. The complexity of both the URL and human
language processing systems along with the fact that phishers
use URLs that contain brand names in different parts of the
URL string [34], suggests that users may have trouble with this
type of prediction. Hence, a systematic empirical evaluation
is critical to form a clear understanding of users’ URL reading
abilities and to adapt our user-facing approaches accordingly.
In this work, we hypothesize that the majority of web users
cannot differentiate between the following two Uniform Re-
source Locators (URLs): https://facebook.profile.com and
https://profile.facebook.com. We take a slight twist on tradi-
tional anti-phishing research. Instead of measuring peoples’
ability to identify phishing links, we focus on their ability to
predict where a URL is likely to lead. To do so, we designed
an online survey where participants were shown 23 URLs
with a range of structures. For each URL, the participant was
asked via a multiple choice question where the URL will lead
and how safe they felt it was to click on, if it was sent from
someone they know.
Research Questions
We focus on two high level research questions: ability to read
a URL and assessment of the safety of a URL.
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RQ1 Can users accurately predict where a URL will go?
RQ1.1 Can users correctly infer from the URL that it will go
to the website of the organization listed in the domain
position rather than the subdomain, and what factors
affect prediction accuracy?
RQ1.2 Can users recognize that the end destination of short-
ened URLs is not easy to predict?
RQ1.3 Can users recognize the end destination of complex
URL structures?
RQ2 What effects users’ assessment of the likely safety of a
URL?
To answer our research questions, we conducted an online
survey with 1929 participants from both Amazon Mechanical
Turk (AMT) 1 and Prolific Acadmic (PA) 2, implemented on
LimeSurvey3, an open source survey tool.
We find that indeed users have difficulty predicting the final
destination of URLs. 32.9% of all participants always selected
the organization name in the URL regardless of its position.
In particular, they struggle to differentiate between a situation
where an organization name they recognize is in the subdomain
versus the domain, with only 8.3% of our participants able to
reliably differentiate. Safety perceptions were also strongly
tied to whether the participant thought that the URL would
lead to a website that sounded like an organisation name or
not.
BACKGROUND
In this paper, we focus on situations where a user is being
asked to click on a URL which may or may not be malicious,
and the information available to the user in advance of clicking,
since once a user has opened a page, they may already be the
victim of a malware attack.
URL Structure
Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) are a standardized format
for describing the location and access method of resources via
the internet [8]. They form a key mechanism for navigating
the web and sharing online resources. To handle the breadth
of possible addressing, a URL structure has many compo-
nents that allow it to be flexible and accommodate all sorts of
addressing situations. Figure 1 shows the same BBC URL writ-
ten in two different ways with its component parts highlighted.
Both URLs will lead to the same page, though one should
generate a phishing warning on most modern browsers. The
<user>:<password> and <port> components are valid parts
of a URL, though they are not commonly used in user-facing
URLs.
In this work, we focus on the <host> component, as it controls
the destination computer which the browser will first try and
contact. The <host> is further broken up using the ‘.’ character
into subdomains, the domain, and the top level domains as
such: <subdomain>.<domain>.<top level domain>. Broadly,
1https://www.mturk.com/
2https://www.prolific.ac/
3https://www.limesurvey.org/
the host in a URL is read similar to a postal address where
the item on the right is the top part of the hierarchy and the
item on the left is the most precise. So facebook.mobile.com
has a top level domain of ’com’, a domain of ’mobile’, and
a subdomain of ’facebook’. When a browser tries to visit
this URL, it will first contact the computer associated with
’com’ to do a lookup for ’mobile’, and then contact ’mobile’
to do an internal lookup for ’facebook’. So mobile.com gets to
decide what ’facebook’ means in its local context. This is why
the hosts image.slashdot.org and image.google.com are in very
different places despite both URLs having the word “image”.
The difference between subdomain, domain, and top level
domain is quite important. The domain typically lists the
organization’s name, while the top level domain indicates
the type of organization being contacted and sometimes what
country they are in, and the subdomains typically indicate a
section of the site. One of the more famous examples of a
top level domain mattering is: http://whitehouse.gov (official
US White House website) vs. http://whitehouse.com (porn
site). The former has a top level domain of ’.gov’ indicating
a government site, the latter has a ’.com’ top level domain
indicating a commercial site.
On the other hand, URL shortening services have short do-
main names, such as bit.ly, and will provide a short unique
alpha numeric string which redirects to another URL which
is typically longer. For example, when asked, bit.ly maps
https://google.com to http://bit.ly/19BiSHW.
Phishing
Phishing is the practice of sending email, or other communi-
cations, with the goal of deceiving the user into clicking on
something they shouldn’t or giving away valuable data. An
in-depth overview of the topic of phishing is beyond the scope
of this paper; we refer the interested reader to Hong’s overview
of phishing [22], and two overview papers on why phishing
works [4, 14]. In this section we focus on work which looks
at deceiving people with malicious URLs. Numerous studies
have shown that people have trouble accurately identifying
phishing URLs [14, 31, 11, 15]. Users are generally more
likely to draw clues from the page that has been loaded than
from the URL or other security indicators [14, 4, 28, 2].
URL Manipulation Techniques
A common phishing tactic is to send a communication claim-
ing that it is vitally important that the user perform an action
using the provided URL, such as logging into their bank. The
communication claims to be from their bank, but on inspection,
the URL does not lead to the bank’s actual website. For exam-
ple, the email could report to be from Bank of the West, but
the URL might be https://bankofthewest.foobar.com. When
the user clicks the link they are taken to a malicious website
which may attempt to infect their computer or mimic a real
login site and ask for the user’s banking credentials.
Phishers typically obscure malicious URLs to make them look
safe using several approaches. In particular, malicious actors
have been shown to use shortened URLs [30, 12, 20, 32, 19,
5], often also receiving high click-through rates. Chhabra et
al. found that URL shorteners are often used in social media
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Figure 1. URL scheme. The example top URL contains all the components including the <user>, <password> and <port> which are rare in publicly
visible URLs. The bottom URL links to the same location, but is a more typical example of what an average user might see.
phishing and spam attacks, especially on Twitter, to hide the
true identity of the phisher [11]. Since users are accustomed
to seeing and clicking on short URLs, it is unclear whether
they are aware of the security and privacy risks associated
with them or not. Possible risks include long-term tracking
cookies, phishing, spamming, drive-by-download attacks, and
link hijacking. Short URLs have been widely explored from
a systems perspective [20] with a focus on analyzing their
redirection chain and click-through traffic. However, few
studies have explored user awareness of the potential risks.
Le-Khac et. al surveyed 100 internet users and found that
there was a moderate to high awareness of their danger despite
their tendency to propagate short URLs [27].
User-Facing solutions
We are not the first to observe that people have difficulty read-
ing URLs. Tim Berners-Lee, author of the RFC on URL struc-
ture [8], once commented about URLs: “I regret that the syntax
is so clumsy. I would like http://www.example.com/foo/bar/baz
to be just written http:com/example/foo/bar/baz....But it is too
late now.” [7]. Most anti-phishing training contains some state-
ment about how to handle URLs in electronic communications.
Typical advice includes: “Don’t click on links”, “Type links
in manually”, “Avoid links with IP addresses”, and “Google
for the page instead” [39, 36].
A study by Gavett et al. looked at phishing susceptibility be-
tween younger and older adults [15]. They asked participants
to visit a set of sites including sites with phishing URLs like
http://www.amazon.jigdee.com. Participants were initially only
shown the URL before clicking and the pages were direct
copies of the real ones. Only older adults refused to log into
the phishing pages, and even then it was only a small percent-
age. The vast majority of participants logged into the pages
without any concerns. Gavett also found that one of the best
predictors of phishing susceptibility was prior experience with
a phishing attack.
User Training
Anti Phishing Phil by Sheng et al. [39] used a gamification
approach where the player is shown several URLs and has to
identify which ones are phishing/fraudulent. Between levels,
the player gets feedback on their mistakes and how they could
have identified the difference.
NoPhish [9, 10] trained people to identify phishing URLs
through a mobile app. Unlike Anti Phishing Phil, the app
includes URL structures such as subdomains in their training,
with good results.
PhishGuru by Kumaraguru et al. [26] used web comics which
appear after a user has clicked on a malicious URL. The work
targets “teachable moments” when people are most receptive
to anti-phishing training and advised people to simply not
click on links in emails at all and instead type the links in. The
“teachable moments” concept is now in active use by many
anti-phishing training organizations including: nowbe4.com,
phishlabs.com, and wombatsecurity.com.
Post-Click Support
Domain highlighting [28] is the practice of only showing the
domain, or graying out the non-domain elements of the text
in the URL bar of the browser. Domain highlighting has been
adopted by several browsers including Chrome and Safari.
The approach is intended to help users correctly discern the
domain component of the URL and not be confused by other
parts of the URL string such as a subdomain or file path. While
promising, the approach has one sizable flaw, the user must
first load a webpage before the highlighting is shown. As a
result, the user must first load the potentially dangerous page,
and then remember to check the URL after it has loaded, which
is not a common behavior [14].
METHODS
To our knowledge, no large scale study has been conducted
that definitively proves that people have difficulty predicting
where a URL will lead. Even though it might sound intuitive
for researchers who have a first hand experience with user-
URL interactions that people find it difficult to read URLs,
much of the security advice given online, such as “Don’t click
on dangerous links”, assumes that end-users can read URLs
with sufficient skill to be able to detect problematic instances.
In 2014 one of the authors gave out a “fun” worksheet to their
Computer Security class which presented a set of increasingly
complex URL structures and asked the students to identify
elements such as the domain and subdomains. Surprisingly,
a large section of the class struggled to answer the question
for even simple URLs. Follow-on versions of the worksheet
were tried out with a Human Computer Interaction course
and a group of Masters students studying Usable Security.
In all cases, the students struggled with basic URL reading
tasks, such as deciding if https://facebook.mobile.com went to
Facebook or to Mobile. The outcome of these exercises was
used as a starting point for the survey design.
Prestudies
From prior work we know that the recognizability of an orga-
nization’s name can impact opinions of trust and safety [14].
To control for this issue, we ran a prestudy to find a set of
organizations that were familiar and that were unfamiliar to
our target populations. We brainstormed a list of globally
well-known organizations and used online lists of start ups and
small newspapers to find the lesser-known organizations. We
surveyed participants on both AMT (n=50) and PA (n=50) to
be sure both target populations had similar opinions about the
organization recognizability. We then selected the most and
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Figure 2. Example of one of the URL subdomain questions. Participants
are shown the URL at the top and then asked a prediction and safety
question about it. The questions are identical for all URLs, but the pro-
vided answers to the first question change based on the URL content.
least recognizable for use in the main the survey. The survey
took an average of 1.5 minutes (AMT) and 2.5 minutes (PA)
to complete. Participants were compensated $0.50 (AMT),
e0.50 (PA).
We also conducted a second pre-study to test the main survey
design, with nearly identical wording and structure to what
is described in Section 3.2 below. We used the pre-study
to trial some wording variations and to make sure that there
were no unexpected differences between how the AMT and
PA populations interacted with the survey. We sampled 100
participants each from AMT and PA. The survey took 9 min
(AMT), 7 min (PA) to complete on average and participants
were compensated $1.50 (AMT), e1.00 (PA).
Survey Instrument
The survey had three sections: introduction, URL questions,
and demographics which were presented to participants in that
order. We detail key parts of the survey below and provide a
full version in [3].
Section 1: Consent Form and Task Clarity Checkup
The survey started with a consent form and a set of instructions
asking participants to answer questions based on reading the
URLs and not typing them into a browser. To ensure that the
participants had read the instructions, we asked them: “What
do you need to do in this survey?”. The correct answer was
“Read links and predict where they will go”, with the other
options being typing in links and clicking on links. Participants
who answered incorrectly were not allowed to progress till they
provided the correct answer. The consent form and instructions
avoided any mention of privacy or security.
Section 2: 23 Randomised URL Blocks (2 Questions/URL)
Participants were shown 23 URL question blocks in random
order. Each block was presented on its own page with an
image of the URL on the top followed first by a destination
prediction question and then by a safety question (Figure 2).
Q1. URL Destination (RQ1): This question asked: “If you
were to type in the above link into a web browser, what website
would open?” The provided answers were in a randomized or-
der and include two parts of the URL (typically the subdomain
and domain), a distractor answer (i.e. Google), “redirects to
another website with a longer link”, “a website which is not
listed”, and an “other” option where the participant could
provide a free-text response. In cases where a second part of
the URL did not exist (i.e. microsoft.com) a second distractor
answer was used instead.
Q2. URL Safety (RQ2): This question asked: “How safe do
you think it would be to click on the link above if you saw it in
an email from someone you know?” Answer options were a
5-level likert scale ranging from “Not safe” to “Very safe”.
Wording for the safety question was highly debated as per-
ceived safety is dependent on context, not just the URL text.
We settled on the above wording using the second prestudy
described above by comparing the above wording with the
alternative: “Would you click on the link above if you saw it in
an email from someone you know?” Both versions provided
a spread of answers, but participants seemed more willing to
answer with strongly agree or disagree to the safety question,
while the clicking question had a narrower range of answers
with neutral being selected frequently.
Section 3: Demographics Questions
Demographics had 12 questions listed on a single page asking
about participants’ gender, age, native language, level of edu-
cation, computing devices used, how often they visit different
types of websites (social media, financial, online games, news,
company), how often they ask for help with computers and
how often others ask them, Westin Privacy index (Section
2.6, [25]), web development or system administrator experi-
ence, and optionally free-text comments.
We also asked them to report if they had typed in any of the
URLs during the length of the study, making it clear that an-
swers would not impact payment. Comments in the second
prestudy described above suggested that taking the survey was
causing people to question their initial URL reading strategy
and switch strategies mid-survey. In the final survey we asked
them what strategy they were using at the beginning of the sur-
vey and what strategy they used at the end. Provided answers
were drawn from our own experience and from comments
made by prestudy participants.
URLs Tested
Each participant saw 23 URLs representing four URL struc-
tures which align with RQ1 sub questions. The full set of
URLs used is listed in Table 1.
Controlling Confounds
We wanted to test peoples’ ability to parse URLs in best case
situations. Therefore, we intentionally avoided most of the
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URL
URL Orgnization Orgnization Organization Group 1 Group 2Structure Industry Recognizablity Name
Microsoft https://microsoft.com
Domain Google https://google.com
Only AMT https://mturk.com (AMT participants only)
PA https://prolific.ac (PA participants only)
Social
Well known Facebook https://facebook.profile.com https://profile.facebook.comSingle Twitter https://mobile.twitter.com https://twitter.mobile.com
Subdomain Less known Travbuddy https://profile.travbuddy.com https://travbuddy.profile.comWeheartit https://weheartit.mobile.com https://mobile.weheartit.com
News
Well known BBC https://bbc.profile.com https://profile.bbc.comCNN https://mobile.cnn.com https://cnn.mobile.com
Less known Dunfermlinepress https://profile.dunfermlinepress.com https://dunfermlinepress.profile.comHaysfreepress https://haysfreepress.mobile.com https://mobile.haysfreepress.com
Financial
Well known Paypal https://paypal.profile.com https://profile.paypal.comWestern Union https://mobile.westernunion.com https://westernunion.mobile.com
Less known Purepoint https://profile.purepoint.com https://purepoint.profile.comRevolut https://revolut.mobile.com https://mobile.revolut.com
Well known Bit.ly https://bit.ly/1bdDlXcShort Goo.gl https://goo.gl/fJOIAv
Less known Po.st https://po.st/If6RgXU.to https://u.to/SbwC
Google https://facebook.com@google.com
Complex Twitter https://twitter.com/facebook.com
Facebook https://facebook.com/picture.html?a=twitter.com
Facebook https://facebook.com/?url=twitter
Table 1. URLs used in the study. For the single subdomain questions participants were divided into two groups to ensure that each participant only saw
each company name once while still seeing both order combinations.
phishing tricks detailed in Section 2.2 and made the following
simplifying decisions:
Https Protocol Thanks to the work of groups like Let’s En-
crypt, any site owner, including phishers, can get a valid
security certificate and have “https” in their URL [34]. We
wanted participants to answer the safety questions based on
the content of the URL not the absence of the https protocol,
so all URLs in the study start with https.
End in .com We limited all URLs to ones ending in .com,
with the exception of the URL shorteners. The .com top
level domain is recognizable by consumers, finding compa-
nies who have a .com domain is easy, and using only one
top-level domain limits study confounds.
Real URLs We base all the URLs on real organizations’
URLs. While we ask participants not to type in URLs, some
percentage are likely to search the Internet for them. This
decision ensures that any URL found through searching will
match, at least in part, the one we present.
Recognizable Names We only used organizations which
have their commonly used name in their URL. For ex-
ample, CNN was included in the study as their URL
(https://cnn.com) is easily identifiable with CNN. The
New York Times was not considered because their URL
(https://nyt.com) uses an abbreviation which is not trivially
identifiable with the organization.
URL Structures
The use of multiple structures was to test a variety of situations,
ensure that participants were seeing a good mix of different
URLs, and prevent habituation to a single URL structure or
answer shape.
Domain Only (Baseline) URLs in this category have no sub-
domain and are the most simple. We included three
URLs which participants should be able to easily recognize:
https://google.com, https://microsoft.com, and depend-
ing on the recruitment platform, either https://mturk.com
(AMT) or https://prolific.ac (PA).
The Microsoft and Google URL questions did not contain
the company name as one of the multiple choice options,
participants were instead expected to answer “A website
which is not listed” or “other”. The company names were
not included for two reasons: 1) to ensure that all answer
options were used at least twice, and 2) the prestudies and
work with students suggested that both URLs are fairly easy
to predict even when students were asked to provide free-
text answers. The AMT and PA URL questions did contain
the organization names within the answer options.
Single Subdomain (RQ1.1) These URLs tested our hy-
pothesis that people “read” URLs by looking for a
recognizable word regardless of whether it is posi-
tioned in the domain or subdomain. Their form was:
https://<subdomain>.<domain>.com.
We therefore designed a set of URLs varying: the location of
the organization name in a URL (subdomain, domain), filler
word for the other position (mobile, profile), how recogniz-
able the organization name is (well known, less known),
and the category of the organization (social media, news,
financial). The result was 24 URLs, with each organization
name appearing twice, once in the domain and once in the
subdomain position. To ensure that each participant saw
each organization name only once, we divided the subdo-
main questions into two groups as shown in Table 1. Each
participant was randomly assigned to group 1 (n=984) or
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MTurk Prolific All Participants
Gender
Male 543 (55.9%) 465 (48.5%) 1008 (52.3%)
Female 423 (43.6%) 486 (50.7%) 909 (47.1%)
No Answer 3 (0.3%) 1 (0.1%) 4 (0.2%)
Other 2 (0.2%) 6 (0.6%) 8 (0.4%)
Education
Some High School 6 (0.6%) 22 (2.3%) 28 (1.5%)
High School 107 (11.0%) 141 (14.7%) 248 (12.9%)
Some College 285 (29.4%) 210 (21.9%) 495 (25.7%)
College 446 (45.9%) 359 (37.5%) 805 (41.7%)
Postgrad 123 (12.7%) 220 (23.0%) 343 (17.8%)
Other 4 (0.4%) 6 (0.6%) 10 (0.5%)
Native Language
English 915 (94.2%) 686 (71.6%) 1601 (83.0%)
Other Languages 56 (5.8%) 272 (28.4%) 328 (17.0%)
Westin Index
Fundamentals 282 (29.0%) 239 (24.9%) 521 (27.0%)
Pragmatic 622 (64.1%) 676 (70.6%) 1298 (67.3%)
Unconcerned 67 (6.9%) 43 (4.5%) 110 (5.7%)
Web Development
No Experience 760 (78.3%) 734 (76.6%) 1494 (77.4%)
Experience 211 (21.7%) 224 (23.4%) 435 (22.6%)
Asking for tech help
I ask others 49 (5.0%) 40 (4.2%) 89 (4.6%)
Others ask me 456 (47.0%) 447 (46.7%) 903 (46.8%)
Technology Use
Desktop 648 (66.7%) 567 (59.2%) 1215 (63.0%)
Laptop 791 (81.5%) 804 (83.9%) 1595 (82.7%)
Tablet 529 (54.5%) 511 (53.3%) 1040 (53.9%)
Smartphone 907 (93.4%) 903 (94.3%) 1810 (93.8%)
Website Use
Company 703 (72.4%) 676 (70.6%) 1379 (71.5%)
Financial 806 (83.0%) 743 (77.6%) 1549 (80.3%)
Game 504 (51.9%) 416 (43.4%) 920 (47.7%)
News 789 (81.3%) 818 (85.4%) 1607 (83.3%)
Social Media 853 (87.8%) 833 (87.0%) 1686 (87.4%)
Table 2. Demographic information. Numbers indicate either the num-
ber of participants who provided that answer or, for Likerts, the num-
ber who indicated “agree” or “strongly agree”, or for usage frequency,
“daily” or “weekly”. Percentages are taken from the total number of
participants from that platform.
group 2 (n=950) and only saw the URLs associated with
their group.
Short URLs (RQ1.2) The majority of short URLs have the
name of the shortening service in the <host> position and
a unique alpha numeric string in the <query-string> loca-
tion, for example: https://bit.ly/1bdDlXc will redirect to
http://www.google.com.
We included four short URLs, two from commonly used
shortening services, and two from relatively unknown short-
ening services. All participants were exposed to all four
shortened URLs.
Complex URLs (RQ1.3) Complex URLs contained two well
known organization names in the URL string and use more
complex structures. These questions had three purposes:
1) see how participants handled having two recognizable
names in the URL, 2) determine if users can differentiate
between the <host>, <user>, <url-path>, and <query-string>
elements, and 3) identify participants that have advanced
URL reading skills.
Recruitment
Participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk
(AMT) and Prolific Academic (PA), both of which are regu-
larly used for advertising academic surveys [24, 33]. Using
both also resulted in a more representative sample as AMT is
primarily North Americans and PA is primarily European.
The survey was advertised as “Opinions on Weblinks” with
an estimated time of 15 minutes and compensation of $1.75
(AMT),e1.50 (PA). All advertisement materials avoided prim-
ing words like “security” or “privacy”. The compensation
amounts were selected to be roughly equal based on the ex-
change rates 4 at the time of the study. Advertised time esti-
mates were calculated based on the time required by slower
pre-study participants to ensure that most participants would
finish within the advertised time.
We screened participants to ensure they were 18 or above,
had not taken our pre-study, and had a minimum approval
rate of 95% on AMT and 90% on PA. Both settings produced
high-quality pre-study answers. We posted tasks on AMT and
PA in multiple batches at different times of the day and days
of the week to ensure we were targeting a range of potential
respondents. The survey was conducted in early April 2017.
The study complied with the Ethics procedure of the School
of Informatics, University of Edinburgh.
Participants
A total of 2030 respondents completed the survey, 1016 (50%)
from AMT and 1014 (50%) from PA. After data cleaning and
coding of “other” answers, we excluded 101 (5%) participants.
Exclusions were done for the following three reasons. 1) In-
correct answers to the AMT or PA URL questions (attention
check, n=62). 2) The distractor answer was selected on more
than two of the subdomain or domain questions (n=14). Com-
plex and short URL questions were not used for exclusion
because they are both harder to answer correctly and more
open to interpretation. 3) There was a temporary issue with
the server which provided the URL images. Any participant
mentioning issues with seeing the URL images was excluded
(n=25). Three people declared themselves to be below 18
years of age; given that all of these ages were below 10, we
regard these as typographical errors or intentional false replies
and include the participants.
There were no differences between included and excluded
participants in age (Wilcoxon test, p<0.5), education (Fisher
test, p<0.8), gender (Fisher test, p<0.6), or survey platform
(Fisher test, p<0.3).
Of the final 1929 participants, 52.3% were male. The age
range was 18-100 years (the second highest age was 77) with
a median of 32 years and an average of 34.5 years (σ=11.5
years). Participants’ native language was primarily English
(AMT=915, 94.2%, PA=686, 71.6%). The next most popular
languages were in order: Portuguese (n=45), Bulgarian (n=40),
Spanish (n=26), Italian (n=23), and German (n=22). 1903
(98.7%) reported using either a desktop or laptop on at least a
weekly basis. Detailed demographics can be found in Table 2.
Survey Analysis
Statistical Analysis: All statistical analyses were conducted
in R. Differences in demographics between platforms and user
groups were analysed using standard non-parametric tests as
4XE http://www.xe.com/
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implemented in coin [23]. The Akaike Information Criterion
and the Bayes Information Criterion were used for assessing
model fit, and χ2 tests for determining significant differences
between two statistical models. For space reasons, model
coefficients and model comparisons are not reported in full.
Establishing User Groups: Use of technology and self-
perceived technology skills are covered by four sets items
in the demographics section (c.f. Table 2). We used latent
class analysis (PoLCA,[1, 29]) to reduce these items to a single
variable, User Group, for further statistical analysis.
Correctness of Decisions: We used generalised linear mixed
models (GLMMs, [16]) to investigate the effects of participant-
level and URL-level characteristics on participants’ ability to
read a URL. Whereas in normal generalised linear models
(e.g., linear or logistic regression), the model coefficients are
the same for all participants, GLMMs allow some coefficients
to vary by participant or participant group. The R packages
used were lme4 [6] and arm [17].
Perceived URL Safety: Since perceived safety is an ordi-
nal variable, we used proportional odds logistic regression
(POLR [1]) to investigate the effects of decision correctness,
URL characteristics, and user group on safety judgments.
Coding Free Text Answers: All the URL questions had a
possible answer of “other” with a free text box. For two of
the domain questions, the correct answer was not listed and
participants were expected to either select the not listed option,
or provide an answer of “other”.
One researcher went through all the “other” answers and
marked those that could be trivially mapped onto one of the ex-
isting answer options, and, in the case of the domain questions,
whether the answer was correct. For example, a participant an-
swered “other” for the URL https://haysfreepress.mobile.com
stating “haysfreepress on the website mobile.com”. From the
comment it is clear that the participants understands that the
URL will attempt to go to the mobile.com website, so their
answer was re-mapped to the provided answer “Mobile’s web-
site”. A second researcher then reviewed all decisions. Any
disagreements were handled through discussion. Answers
which were ambiguous or expressed confusion were left as
“other”. For example, for https://weheartit.mobile.com, a par-
ticipant responded “music website”. Henceforward, we use
the term other to refer to answers where the user both indi-
cated the “other” option, and provided an answer which could
not be trivially mapped to an existing answer option using the
above procedure. Excluding the single domain answers where
“other” was the expected response, 188 “other” answers were
re-mapped onto other codes, 114 of which were re-mapped as
subdomain.
Limitations
Our work recruited participants from the online crowd sourc-
ing platforms AMT and PA. Research on AMT workers has
shown them to generally be more privacy conscious and more
technically skilled than average Americans [24, 38]. Partic-
ipants on both platforms are also likely professional survey
takers with extensive experience answering common survey
questions such as Westin’s Privacy Index. The above-average
technical skill and experience with the internet also likely
impacted our results as participants would have been more
familiar with concepts like links and safety. However, we ar-
gue that while not representative, these participants represent
a best case scenario and that we would expect the general
population to have less knowledge of URL reading.
Repeated use of the filler words “profile” and “mobile” could
have caused participants to notice the repetition and change
their answers. However, we feel that the impact was minimal
since the repeated words could be interpreted as either the
correct or wrong answer. Our results below also show that
people struggle to read the subdomain URLs correctly, so it is
unlikely that the repetition improved accuracy.
Our study focuses on simple URL reading rules that we might
reasonably expect the general public to know. This was in-
tentional, as we wanted to create a baseline for future work.
There are likely many more factors that impact a user’s ability
to read a URL, such as more complex URL structures.
Participants may have had a range of interpretations of the term
“safety” in the second question asked for each URL. Safety in
URL reading is often contextual in ways that are challenging
to replicate in a survey. While we tried to give minimal context,
it is still very likely that participants interpreted “safety” in
different ways ranging from computer security to privacy.
RESULTS
User Groups
We compared the fit of polynomial latent class models for 2–8
classes. For each class, we determined the best model out of a
sample of 100, to avoid local minima. 1000 iterations proved
sufficient for parameter estimation. The most parsimonious
model consisted of three groups of users. In the following, we
will call them mobile users, desktop users, and power users.
Mobile Users (n = 761,39.3%) have the least coding expe-
rience (8.0%). They use laptops (92.3%) and smartphones
(90.3%) every day, and are least likely to be asked for help.
Desktop Users (n = 367,19.0%) use desktops every day
(95.6%), but only 3.8% use laptops regularly. They are also
the least likely to use a smartphone every day (77.4%). Finally,
Power Users (n= 806,41.7%) are most likely to have coding
or web development experience (37.8%), most likely to be
asked for help, and the heaviest smartphone (98.5% daily) and
social media (84.9% daily) usage.
The three categories have distinct gender and educational pro-
files. 60.6% of mobile users are female, whereas desktop users
tend to be male (54.0%), and power users are mostly male
(64.4%). 59.7% of mobile users and 64.9% of power users
have at least a graduate or postgraduate degree, compared to
only 47.1% of desktop users. The three classes do not differ
by Westin privacy type (χ2 test, χ2(4) = 6.35, p < 0.18) or
age (Kruskal-Wallis test, χ2(2) = 3.8, p< 0.15).
Single Domain URLs
Participants were shown three URLs which contained only
a domain (Table 1). Here, we report the results for Mi-
crosoft and Google. The most obvious correct answer was
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Figure 3. Number of single subdomain questions each respondent cor-
rectly answered when the organization was in the subdomain (left, out
of 6), domain (middle, out of 6), or in total (right, out of 12).
“not listed”. “Redirect” was also acceptable, given that both
https://microsoft.com and https://google.com often redirect
to https://www.microsoft.com and https://www.google.com.
As expected, both questions were fairly easy to answer with
1793 (92.7%) answering both by either indicating the domain,
or by indicating that the correct destination was not listed.
Single Subdomain URLs
The 12 URLs used for this part of the study are sum-
marised in Table 1. On average participants answered 6.4
(± 2.6) out of 12 of these questions correctly. Looking at
the effect of the position of the organization name in the
URL, we find that when the organization was in the domain
(i.e. https://profile.facebook.com), participants generally an-
swered correctly (5.2±1.4 out of 6), and when it was in the
subdomain, they did not (1.2±2 out of 6).
Of the 10840 total incorrect answers provided, 9418 (86.9%)
indicated that the URL led to the subdomain. 7.9% (n= 851)
indicated that the correct answer was not listed, and 3.5%
(n= 384) thought that the URL redirected.
While answers other than the domain are technically inac-
curate, an argument could be made that thinking the URL
redirects or is not listed is safer than thinking the URL leads
to the subdomain. Selecting “redirect” or “not listed” was
also somewhat common with 32% (n=618) of respondents
providing at least one such answer. If we considered these
answers correct, then respondents would still only average 7
± 2.5 out of 12 correct.
Factors Influencing Participant Judgements.
Using GLMMs, we modelled the effect of three variables on
the correctness of participant judgements: position of organi-
zation name (domain versus subdomain), organization name,
and user group. To estimate the effect of adding each term,
we compared models with and without the term. The mod-
els assessed and their AIC values are listed in Table 4. The
key predictors of correct responses are position (model B ver-
sus model A: χ2(1) = 10885, p< 0.0001) and the interaction
Correct
User Group Position N %
Mobile User Subdomain 727 15.9%
Domain 3859 84.5%
Total 4586 50.2%
Desktop User Subdomain 441 20.0%
Domain 1942 88.2%
Total 2383 54.1%
Power User Subdomain 1226 25.4%
Domain 4173 86.3%
Total 5399 55.8%
Table 3. Correct responses to single subdomain questions by position of
organization name in URL by User Group.
ID Model Df AIC
A 1 + (1 | User Group) 3 32027
B 1 + Position + (1|UG) 3 21144
C 1 + Organization + (1|UG) 13 32026
D 1 + Pos. + Org. + (1|UG) 14 21147
E 1 + Pos. x Org. + (1|UG) 25 20993
F 1 + Pos. x Org. + (1 + Pos.|UG) 27 20966
Table 4. Logistic Mixed Regression Models for the Single Subdomain
data. Position = organization name in domain versus subdomain, Or-
ganization = organization name, 1 = intercept, x = includes interaction
term. Df = degrees of freedom, AIC = Akaike Information Criterion.
The model coefficients for the first set of variables are the same for all
cases, the coefficients for the variables in brackets vary by user group.
between position and organization (model E versus model
B: χ2(22) = 194.72, p < 0.0001). The model is further im-
proved by letting the position effect vary by user group (model
F versus model E: χ2(2) = 31.675, p< 0.0001).
The position of the organization name had the largest impact
on judgement accuracy. Participants tended to assume that
the URL led to the named organization’s website, regardless
of whether it was in the domain or in the subdomain, with
32.2% (n=623) always indicating that the URL went to the
organization name in the URL, and only 8.3% (n=161) always
indicating the correct answer of domain.
The effect of organisation name was moderated by the position
of that name in the URL. For Twitter, CNN, and Western
Union, participants were more likely to be correct if the name
was in the domain position and less if it was in the subdomain.
Finally, there is a difference in accuracy between user groups.
Power users are overall more accurate than desktop users, who
are in turn more accurate than mobile users (Table 3). Power
users are also more likely to correctly read URLs where the
organisation name is in the subdomain. However, overall,
performance is still relatively poor for all three groups.
Short URLs
For short URLs, the “correct” answer is challenging to deter-
mine since Redirect (the URL will redirect to a different web-
site), Not Listed (the target URL is not listed in the responses),
and domain name (bit, goo, po, or u) are all plausibly correct.
93.4% of all answers were for one of these options.
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Factors Influencing Participant Judgements.
For this analysis, we only consider the answers Redirect and
Not Listed, since both answers reflect that it is impossible to
determine the exact final destination from the URL. Using
GLMM, we constructed three models, one looking at Redirect
judgements, one looking at Not Listed judgements, and one
combining both judgements into a single response variable.
Overall, shortener type (Well Known or Less Known) did not
influence whether the answer was redirect or not listed. How-
ever, participants are more likely to identify bit.ly links as
redirecting, and other link shorteners as not listed. In general,
mobile users are less likely to choose one of the two options
Redirect / Not Listed than desktop or power users.
Complex URLs
The https://facebook.com@google.com URL was confusing for
participants. They were split on if it would go to a site not
listed (30.1%), Facebook (28.3%), Google (14.7%), Redirect
(10.8%), or Other (16.1%). The correct answer is that it would
go to Google and attempt to login as the user “facebook.com”,
likely generating a warning on most modern browsers.
The 16.1% who wrote in responses strongly felt that this URL
would result in an error due to it either not being a real URL,
or because there is no such website. As one participant put it:
“almost looks like an email attached to a web link.”
Respondents did somewhat better on the
https://twitter.com/facebook.com question, with 62.2%
correctly answering Twitter and very few thinking that it
would lead to Facebook (6.2%). 16.5% were likely to indicate
that the URL led to a page that was not listed, while 8.4%
answered “other” (8.4%). These responses typically indicated
that the URL wasn’t real, would result in an error page, or
simply couldn’t exist: “It wouldn’t work because there’s no
URL that includes both Twitter and Facebook.”
Perceived Safety
For analysis purposes, the ratings of perceived safety were
converted to a numerical scale, with 1 corresponding to “Not
Safe”, and 5 corresponding to “Very Safe”. Overall, partici-
pants rated Single Subdomain URLs as somewhat safe (me-
dian: 4, inter quartile range: 3–4), and Shortened URLs as
somewhat unsafe (median: 2, inter quartile range: 1–3).
Single Subdomain.
The best fitting model for safety judgments for Single Subdo-
main URLs, with an AIC of 63385, consists of the variables
Correctness (whether the correct destination was given), Posi-
tion, Organization, all two-way interactions, and the three-way
interaction between all terms. Overall, participants are more
likely to rate a URL safe if they think that it goes to the organi-
zation (median: 4; inter quartile range: 3–4 if the organization
is in the subdomain, and 3–5 if the organization is in the do-
main). There are strong company-specific effects. For exam-
ple, as Figure 4 shows, URLs involving PayPal are generally
regarded as somewhat unsafe when participants do not think
that the URL will lead them to PayPal, whereas their median
rating of URLs involving Western Union, another well known
payment provider, is neutral in the same context. The dif-
ferences between user groups are significant (Kruskal-Wallis
test, χ2(2) = 25.7, p< 0.0001), but small. Mobile Users tend
slightly more towards neutral ratings than other user groups.
Short URLs.
For Short URLs, the best fitting model, with an AIC of 20355,
includes the variables Answer (for answer given), Shortener
Type, and their two-way interaction. When participants choose
one of the correct answers, Redirect or Not Listed, they are far
more circumspect in their judgment. We also find that bit.ly
and goo.gl are regarded as safer than po.st and u.to. There
are no differences between user groups (Kruskal-Wallis test,
χ2(2) = 1.0, p< 0.62).
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Being able to accurately compare a URL to an expected des-
tination is an important skill needed in detecting fraudulent
URLs, such as those sent in phishing communications. Our
findings clearly illustrate that participants, even those with ex-
tensive computer experience, are unable to accurately predict
the destinations of relatively simple and trick-free URLs. In-
stead of recognising that URLs typically go to the organization
listed in the domain position, our participants tended to select
the recognisable organization name in the URL, even if it was
located in non-domain positions, such as the subdomain.
However, users were not necessarily consistent in their URL
reading approaches, with only 32.2% consistently selecting the
organization name and 8.1% consistently selecting the domain.
Technology use impacted their ability to correctly read URLs,
but the impact was fairly low, with mobile users correctly
answering only 15.9% of the questions with the organization
in the subdomain, and power users only 25.4%. The results
are concerning as they indicate that even technically skilled
users struggle to accurately predict the destination of a basic
URL.
Participants were more likely to rate a URL as safe to click
on if they thought that its destination was the organisation
named in the URL. They were also more dubious of short
URLs than the domain URLs, single subdomain URLs, and
complex URLs. This result is somewhat good as it indicates
that users can identify that the destinations of short URLs are
more difficult to predict than the destinations of longer ones.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Our findings illustrate that participants, even heavy technology
users (power users), are unable to accurately predict the desti-
nation of a clearly written URL. Based on the “other” answers,
as well as our own experience, users are “reading” URLs by
looking for large familiar names and assuming that these are
the true destinations. The tactic is not irrational, as the vast
majority of URLs users likely encounter on a daily basis have
only one large organization name and that name is the page
destination. Large organizations also protect their web brand
by buying or otherwise removing similar-looking domains,
reducing the number of legitimate similar domains a user is
likely to see. The result is that users believe that URLs will
go to the large familiar looking word because it is the only
possible destination. The observation has implications for
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Figure 4. Perceived Safety of Single Subdomain URLs. 1= Not Safe, 5 = Very Safe. Subdomain/Domain: Position of the Organization Name.
URL Facebook Twitter Google Distractor Redirect Not listed Other
https://facebook.com@google.com 569 - 296 0 217 606 325
https://twitter.com/facebook.com 125 1252 - 11 125 332 169
https://facebook.com/?url=twitter 1527 124 - 3 166 140 53
https://facebook.com/picture.html?a=twitter.com 1636 107 - 1 118 102 49
Table 5. Answers to questions involving URLs with more complex structures and two company names.
both how we present URLs to people, and the misconceptions
that must be corrected during training. Simply telling users to
look at the URL is not sufficient, they need training, or better,
support, to be able to differentiate between the actual desti-
nation and distracting familiar words. It is also unclear how
effective embedded approaches, such as domain highlighting,
are at correcting misconceptions, especially in user groups
like power users who feel confident at using the Internet or
users of smartphones who may be unaware that they can view
URLs.
We would like to challenge the reader to look past the prob-
lem of teaching users to correctly read a URL and instead
focus on the problem of how to present users with information
about a link’s true destination. The two may sound similar
but the problems are actually quite different. The question of
where a URL leads is surprisingly complex. Even answering
a basic question such as: “does microsoftemail.com belong to
Microsoft?”, is not easy even for a computer, and gets harder
the less popular a website is. Examples like windows.net or
googleusercontent.com are even more challenging to under-
stand as both are hosting services owned by Microsoft and
Google respectively, where clients pay to put their content. So
the domains have valid certificates but the subdomains can
contain user-controlled content, including phishing pages. To
solve the phishing problem, we need to not just help users read
a URL, but help them accurately understand who controls the
content at the destination they are visiting. To accomplish that
task, we need a stronger understanding of how people with all
types of backgrounds think about website content ownership.
URL shortening services and redirects make URL reading
even more complex. A URL might lead to a website owned by
a known trusted organization, say Google, but then redirect to a
malicious website. Our results show that people are generally
aware that the destinations of short URLs are challenging
to predict. But redirecting URLs are virtually impossible to
identify from the URL itself, and even computers can’t identify
them without first visiting the URL’s first destination.
Finally, the concept of safety when visiting a link is complex,
contextual, and individual. Phishing or URLs that lead to
malicious sites are considered bad by most people. But it is
more challenging to automatically classify URLs that lead to
websites that sell visitors’ information to marketers, contain
fake news, or contain content that a portion of the population
might find offensive. For these situations, users need to be
aware of where they are going and to be able to make individ-
ual decisions about how “safe” it is to go there. As mentioned
earlier, knowing who controls the content on a page is valuable
for users not only to compare the expected destination with
the actual one, but also to be aware of who created the content
they are ingesting and who might be recording information
about the user.
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